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ABSTRACT
Since the 2003 Iraq war, the Middle East and North Africa has entered 
into a New Regional Cold War, characterised by two competing 
logics: on the one hand, the politicisation of sectarianism opposing 
a Saudi-led Sunni bloc against an Iran-led Shia bloc and, on the 
other, an intra-Sunni cleavage around the mobilisation of political 
Islam, embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters vs its 
opponents. Blending Buzan and Weaver’s regional security complex 
theory with Donnelly’s notion of ‘heterarchy’ and applying it to the 
cold wars the region has experienced, the similarities and differences 
between the Arab Cold War of the 1950s/60s and the New Regional 
Cold War reveal the increasing number of heterarchic features within 
the regional security complex: multiple and heterogeneous power 
centres, different power rankings, a more visible and relevant role of 
non-state and transnational actors, and the fragmentation of regional 
norms.
Over the last few decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has witnessed external 
military interventions, state fracturing, domestic democratic upheavals, visible state-society 
cleavages, the rise of coercive sub-national and transnational actors, the consolidation of 
two opposing geopolitical blocs, proxy wars, and an increasing number of regional and 
international powers meddling in various local conflicts.
The increasing salience of the regional geopolitical rivalry between a Saudi-dominated 
Sunni camp and an opposing Iran-led one should have led to the strengthening of intra-
camp cohesion and solidarity, subsuming all other minor dissonances. In particular, accord-
ing to different theoretical approaches – be they balance of power, balance of threat or 
securitisation theory – facing what has been increasingly considered by Gulf monarchies an 
existential threat to their survival in their current shape, the intra-Sunni alignment should 
have displayed a higher degree of internal consistency, a ‘rally round the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) flag’ effect and, more significantly, a move toward regionalism under the 
guise of a more unified GCC. Not only has this trend not materialized, with the post-2011 
GCC evolution showing ebbs and flows both institutionally and on the policy level – as 
attested to by the 2017 boycott of Qatar by fellow GCC countries – but the underbalancing 
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2   R. HANAU SANTINI
of the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued unabated. Both these elements call for further 
scrutiny at the theoretical and the empirical level of analysis.
This article will first illustrate how the multifaceted instances of regionalisation in the 
MENA region have failed to translate into regionalism. It will then review and suggest 
adjustments to the regional security complex (RSC) theory worked out by Barry Buzan and 
Ole Weaver, before applying it to geopolitical trajectories in the MENA region. The MENA 
RSC is composed by three subcomplexes, North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf. Within 
each of these, security interdependence is especially intense as their genealogy is linked to 
a specific conflict which acted as a baptism by fire. While the Levant subcomplex, framed 
around the Arab-Israeli conflict, has been deemed the determining subcomplex within the 
region, this article argues that the Gulf subcomplex (which formed after Britain’s withdrawal 
from the area and includes, beyond Gulf Arab states, Iraq and Iran), has increasingly become 
the dominant one in shaping regional security dynamics, and is more and more interlinked 
with the Levant subcomplex.
RSC theory will be refined thanks to the conceptual framework of heterarchy, recently 
introduced into International Relations theory by Jack Donnelly. Heterarchies are systems 
with multiple, heterogeneous centres, or more precisely “systems of multiple functionally 
differentiated non-territorial centers arranged in divided or tangled hierarchies”.1 While 
Donnelly has employed the concept of heterarchy mostly with reference to domestic polit-
ical orders or the evolution of the international system, it will be shown how this notion 
can refine RSC theory by introducing an additional ordering principle beyond anarchy and 
hierarchy, and allowing for the conceptualisation of a regional order characterised by the 
diffusion of a friend-enemy logic among both state and non-state actors.
In the third part, an historical overview coupled with a revised, heterarchy-based RSC 
approach will be applied to the analysis of the current New Regional Cold War (NRCW). 
The article will compare the region’s recent geopolitical alignments and re-alignments with 
that of the Arab Cold War of the 1950s/60s, through the prism of regionalisation and the 
limited regionalism in evidence across different historical phases.
The article will end by empirically demonstrating how the notion of heterarchy can be 
heuristically applied to the study of regional geopolitics. The examples provided attest to the 
increasingly heterarchical nature of the regional order, in which the coexistence of different 
hierarchies and multiple rankings among state and non-state actors has become a defining 
feature of the regional insecurity architecture.
The MENA region: a tale of regionalisation without regionalism
Few other world regions display the same degree of regionalisation as the Middle East 
and North Africa and yet few, if any, have so little regionalism. While regionalisation is 
a spontaneous, bottom-up, endogenous process involving a variety of non-state actors 
organised in formal and informal networks, centred around strong cultural, political and 
social dimensions, regionalism is a state-led process of integration, whereby formal regional 
institutions and organisations, mostly in the economic and security realms, are established 
and sustained.2
1Donnelly, “heterarchic Structure of International Governance”.
2Börzel and risse, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism.
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THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR  3
Understood in a broad sense, examples of regionalisation abound, thanks to the existence 
of strong collectively shared features in the region at the social, religious, cultural and lin-
guistic levels. Instances of regionalisation include the 1950s and ’60s secular revolutionary 
pan-Arab ideals, the reverberation of political Islam in the 1980s and, starting from the 
2011 Arab uprisings, the diffusion of new revolutionary democratic norms. Accordingly, the 
region has no shortage of social and ideational referents, which travel quite easily beyond 
national boundaries, becoming sources of allegiance and normative frameworks for intra- 
regional social and political mobilisation.
Yet, rather than leading towards forms of regionalism, normative and policy fragmen-
tation of the regional order has taken several shapes and has been re-articulated around 
changing threat perceptions regarding who/what poses the most immediate danger to the 
security and stability of conservative Gulf monarchies. Ideational referents have become 
hostage to framing processes whereby even regimes belonging to the same geopolitical 
camp are constructed as enemies and henceforth treated as such, as exemplified by the 
Saudi-initiated crisis with Qatar which erupted in March 2014 and again, even more spec-
tacularly, in June 2017.
Regionalism is a state-led process of integration in various policy arenas, traditionally 
progressing from lower to higher politics thanks to spillover effects, and embodied in the 
creation of regional organisations. In the Middle East and North Africa, regionalism can 
count on a number of formal organisations, ranging from the Arab League, which dates back 
to the end of World War Two, to the Arab Maghreb Union and the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation, which have hardly evolved in terms of integration, to the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, more recent and yet increasingly relevant.
Most of these organisations subsist in an under-institutionalised form and with limited 
autonomy vis-à-vis their creators, showing scarce development of supranational, rather than 
intergovernmental traits. The only organisation which has shown some dynamism in terms 
of evolution and attempts at promoting further integration has been the GCC.
The genealogy of the GCC, created in 1981, can be traced back to at least three events: 
the 1979 overthrow of the Shah in Iran by way of a cross-ideological coalition, rapidly high-
jacked by an Islamist revolutionary and expansionist ideology; the subsequent outbreak of 
war between Iran and Iraq – two revolutionary regimes with hegemonic ambitions which 
then locked into a decade-long war;3 and, lastly, the increased sense of importance and for-
eign policy autonomy by Gulf countries due, among other things, to the oil bonanza. Thus, 
the emergence of the GCC came in part as a response to a heightened threat perception from 
post-revolutionary Iran, but also as an attempt to establish an alternative to the Arab League 
for Gulf policymaking, at a time when, thanks to their increased financial capacities, Gulf 
countries feared becoming the financiers of the region’s post-turmoil stabilization efforts – 
without necessarily being acknowledged as full-fledged political players.4
Rather than institutionally embodying specific social, cultural or religious norms, 
Gulf regionalism has mostly been driven by perceptions of insecurity, with institutional 
integration within the Arab Gulf considered better protection than that offered by the 
main existing Arab regional organisation, the Arab League. Yet, while being the only sub- 
regional organisation with prospects for security and defence integration, progress beyond 
declaratory policy has remained limited (even though it has included strengthened security 
3Ulrichsen, “Implications of the Qatar crisis”.
4carvalho pinto, “From ‘Follower’ to ‘role model’”.
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4   R. HANAU SANTINI
cooperation) for both exogenous and endogenous reasons. On the one hand, the GCC has 
struggled to become the Gulf ’s main venue for defence policymaking as the US security 
umbrella has been extended to Gulf countries on a bilateral basis rather than under the 
aegis of regionalism. On the other hand, some small Gulf countries, most vocally Oman, 
have resisted the increasingly frequent integration attempts spearheaded by Saudi Arabia 
since the 2011 Arab uprisings. These include King Abdullah’s vision for a closer ‘Gulf Union’ 
put forward at the December 2011 GCC summit in Riyadh, or then Saudi Foreign Minister 
Prince Saud al-Faisal’s June 2012 proposal for an integrated military and regional security 
policy, which has since then been tabled at every annual GCC summit.5
Despite the richness of regionally shared cultural, social and religious referents and the 
plethora of regional organisations and debate surrounding their status and evolution, the 
region has been depicted as a “region without regionalism”,6 and the interplay between these 
two dimensions remains ambiguous at best.7 Namely, while one would expect regionali-
sation to be positively correlated with processes of regionalism, in the MENA region the 
opposite seems to have occurred. Morten Valbjørn argues that the high interpenetration 
on the social, cultural and religious levels seems to have slowed down processes of insti-
tutional integration.8
This article goes along with this insight and suggests that times of increased regionalisa-
tion can actually correspond to a slowing down of institutional integration. In other words, 
if heightened regionalisation – to be understood as a higher occurrence of intra-regional 
interpenetration and higher permeability by regional states to transnational regional ref-
erents – is perceived as an ideational threat to regime security, prospects for regionalism 
will wane. However, it also posits that, while clearly defined threat perceptions by leading 
regional states can increase prospects for regionalism, when the identification of enemies 
spans different ideological camps – a form of ideological multipolarity in the words of Mark 
Haas9 or normative fragmentation as Barnett would put it,10 – this hampers regionalism.
Even more surprisingly, at a time of a New Regional Cold War, regional organisations, 
which have supposedly been created to solve collective problems, show a continuing low 
degree of institutionalisation and efficacy. Their under-performance occurs despite percep-
tions of increased security threats, both a cause and a consequence of processes of regional 
securitisation and militarisation. The New Regional Cold War has so far failed to catalyse 
the regional institutional developments that would lead to further political, economic and 
security integration, and if anything, has fragmented the existing key regional security 
organisation, the GCC, while militarising its outreach and activities.
Towards a heterarchic regional security complex theory
The regional system has traditionally been considered deeply penetrated or interdepend-
ent.11 While this sounds axiomatic to scholars of the region, visualising the region as an 
5Ulrichsen, “Implications of the Qatar crisis”.
6aarts, “The Middle east”.
7Valbjørn, “north africa and the Middle east”.
8Ibid.
9haas, “Ideological polarity and balancing”.
10Barnett, Dialogues in Arab politics, 49-52.
11For a critical literature review and still very analytically powerful considerations on the systemic level of analysis of Middle 
east international relations, see Gause, “Systemic approaches to Middle east”.
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THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR  5
interpenetrated one means rejecting the neorealist model of states with governments able 
to insulate their domestic systems from external influences – like billiard balls that only 
come into contact at their hard outer shell – and adopting the view that sees “a set of 
interconnected organisms separated only by porous membranes”.12 Notwithstanding the 
reasons for the penetrated nature of the regional system, be it the existence of generative 
conflicts,13 cultural and identity markers, or the socially constructed nature of the region 
by external players,14 few would debate that despite these inter-linkages, the region fares 
poorly in terms of regionalism. As was argued previously, regionalisation and regionalism 
hardly go hand in hand, especially in the MENA region, where the permeability of states 
is not a constant: at times of retrenchment of sub- and trans-national norms calling for 
large-scale allegiances, like pan-Arabism, Islamism, or revolutionary ideals, as was the case 
in the 1970s, national dynamics displayed a higher degree of insulation from cross-border 
appeals and ideational threats.
Carl Brown, who famously defined the Middle East as “a penetrated system, one subject 
to an exceptional level of external intervention and yet, by virtue of its cultural distinctive-
ness, stubbornly resistant to subordination”,15 distinguished between extra-regional and 
domestic/regional penetration. In his view, the international relations of the Middle East 
were characterised by frequent shifts in alliances, heavy penetration of the system by outside 
powers, a zero-sum logic and an overall trend towards “homeostasis”, featuring the inability 
of any regional player to substantially modify the existing balance of power.16
Whether extra-regional actors can belong to a regional order or not distinguishes differ-
ent regional security approaches: for example, in David Lake and Patrick Morgan’s regional 
orders,17 membership can be overlapping as regional systems are and remain open, while in 
Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver’s regional security complex (RSC) theory, regional complexes 
are mutually exclusive and even great powers can only belong to one RSC.18
Regional security complex theory was first elaborated by Buzan and Weaver in 1983 
and then substantially modified in 1998 and 2003. It is in this latest, much less state- 
centric version, that RSC will be taken as the point of departure of an analysis of the New 
Regional Cold War. Regional security complexes are “sets of units whose major processes 
of securitization, de-securitization or both are so inter-linked that their security problems 
cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another”.19 They are defined by 
durable (but not permanent) patterns of amity and enmity, taking the form of sub-global, 
geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence. In other words, perceptions 
of security and insecurity lie at the heart of regional configurations of order, as perceptions 
structure socially constructed relations among regional actors.
The key elements at the basis of any RSC are three sets of dichotomies, in addition to 
power distribution among actors: anarchy versus integration (polarity), amity versus enmity 
(relations among units), and securitization versus de-securitization (processes of threat 
12Korany and Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab States, 84.
13Buzan and Weaver, Regions and Powers.
14halliday, Middle East in International Relations; Bilgin, Regional Security in Middle East.
15Brown, International politics and Middle East, 3-5. on the arab world’s permeability, see also noble, “From arab to Middle 
eastern system”, and for an alternative view, see Salloukh and Brynen, Persistent Permeability.
16Brown, International politics and Middle East, 6-8.
17lake and Morgan, Regional Orders.
18Buzan and Weaver, Regions and Powers, 48-9.
19Ibid., 43-5.
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6   R. HANAU SANTINI
construction).20 The first element, however, needs to be qualified. While the region has 
tended to be considered a test case for realists, given its high level of war-proneness, volatility 
of alliances, emphasis on hard security, and absence of strong regional institutions,21 the lack 
of progress towards integration and the limited extent of regionalism does not necessarily 
imply that the ordering principle of the regional order is anarchy. Namely, the lack of a clear 
hierarchy and the shifting ranking and power perceptions among regional players qualify 
the regional order for being conceptualised as neither anarchic nor hierarchal, but rather 
an example of heterarchical order.
The notion of heterarchy was originally used by archaeologists, referring to “a system 
composed of differentiated but unranked segments, where no clear hierarchical ordering 
of social segments can be detected”.22 When applied to contemporary forms of political 
authority, as argued by Birgit Embalò, “[t]he heterarchy concept is opposed to the ideal of 
the hierarchical representation of the state as standing above and disciplining other power 
groups within the society”.23 Heterarchical orders refer to systems with multiple and often 
‘tangled’ hierarchies.24 Heterarchy can become a label under which, precisely because the 
regional actors’ inter-connectedness is so high, both domestic and regional power dynamics 
can be subsumed. Different configurations of political order exist, according to how ranking 
operates. Ranking is a manifestation of vertical differentiation, and is a function of two attrib-
utes: political authority and material coercive capabilities. Orders can be without ranking 
(anarchy or autarchy), or they can have a single ranking (hierarchy), or multiple rankings 
(heterarchy). In unranked orders, anarchy is characterised by fragmentation of political 
authority and an unclear distribution of coercive material capabilities, while autarchy occurs 
when actors have equal authority and control over material coercive resources. Hierarchies 
can take at least two shapes: if they are based on legitimate authority, they are command 
hierarchies, while if they are based on coercive capabilities they are control hierarchies. 
Lastly, heterarchies, a distinctive type of vertical differentiation, imply a differential rule 
and can be soft or hard (or occupy a position on a continuum between the two).25 In inter-
national terms, heterarchies imply a simultaneous concentration and dispersion of power.
Looking at the MENA regional security complex through the prism of heterarchy makes 
it possible to challenge assumptions traditionally held by neorealists and to some extent 
shared by RSC: the dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy as the only two structural 
ordering principles; the excessive state-centric emphasis, and clear demarcation between the 
domestic and regional or international level. This is because heterarchy introduces a third 
ordering principle beyond hierarchy and anarchy, it emphasizes the role of sub-national, 
transnational and international actors – even in processes of fragmentation of the existing 
political order – and accepts more blurred lines between the reciprocal influences of the 
domestic and regional levels, overcoming the usual second-third image IR debate.26 Once 
the first element, polarity, has been re-conceptualised, the other two key elements of RSC, 
20Ibid, 88.
21Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Brown, International Politics and Middle East; David, “explaining Third World alignment”; 
ryan, Inter-Arab alliances.
22Blanton and Fargher, Collective action in the formation, 89-90.
23embalò, “civil-military relations and political order”, 255.
24Donnelly, “rethinking political structures”.
25Ibid.
26Gourevitch, “The Second Image reversed”.
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THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR  7
amity-enmity and securitization-desecuritization, complement the approach, and allow for 
a comprehensive reading of the region’s conflictual dynamics.
Regional Cold Wars from the 1950s to 2017 
The Arab Cold War and the insufficiency of ideological cleavages
In the 1950s and 1960s, as famously recalled by Malcom Kerr, the region witnessed an 
Arab Cold War which, although it took place during the wider Cold War and in a geo-
politically crucial region for both superpowers, was mostly dictated by Arab agency. The 
dynamics of this regional Cold War were driven by Arab capitals, especially Cairo, Baghdad 
and Riyadh.27 Inter-Arab relations were dominated by a deep ideological cleavage, broadly 
opposing socialist revolutionary republics against Western-leaning conservative monar-
chies. As acknowledged by RSC theory, the mere distribution of power among the com-
peting camps would be insufficient to account for the emerging pattern of conflict, were 
it not for ideational elements and threat perceptions. The key ideational element, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab rhetoric – broadcast via his Voice of the Arabs (Sawt al-Arab), an 
Egyptian transnational radio program listened to across the Arab world in the 1950s and ’60s 
– stirred feelings of a raison de la nation arabe.28 This was perceived as an existential threat 
by conservative monarchies, which fought back by appealing and strengthening references 
to a raison d’état. This substantially trumped any ambition of fulfilling pan-Arab designs or 
letting a popular instance of regionalisation lead to regionalism and regional integration. 
State-driven geopolitical competition between the two blocs created a transnational political 
activism premised on specific understandings of Arabism and Islamism: while Egypt was 
promoting a particular brand of a socialist revolutionary model, Saudi Arabia countered 
the perceived ideational threat by standing for and actively supporting a monarchical model 
legitimised by the religious establishment.
The epitomization of Egypt’s attempt at re-ordering the regional system was its unifi-
cation with Syria in the United Arab Republic (UAR) between 1958 and 1961. While the 
ideological cleavage was the master framework determining the divisions between the two 
camps, the socialist bloc, broadly allied with Moscow and oriented against the pro-Western 
monarchies in the region, was far from monolithic. In other words, despite the existence of 
two geopolitical camps fighting for survival and influence across the region, the ideological 
cleavage was not sufficient to prioritise alliances consistently and maintain them. Heterarchic 
elements emerged and led to rapidly changing rankings in alliance choices linked to chang-
ing threat perceptions to regime security. If socialist pan-Arabism had oriented foreign 
policy choices and the creation of a common revolutionary front, the norm of sovereignty 
had not dissolved altogether, as attested to by post-1958 Iraq. Namely, splits occurred in 
the wake of Iraq’s nationalist revolution in 1958, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim who, despite 
ideological proximity to Nasser’s pan-Arab views, refused to accept Egyptian tutelage.29 As 
demonstrated also by the early break-up of the UAR, Nasser’s lack of a collegial attitude – 
even among like-minded regimes – led to shifting alignments, with Syria and Iraq opting 
to balance against Egyptian hegemonic designs. The revolutionary bloc fragmented over 
27Kerr, The Arab cold war, 1958-1967.
28Valbjørn and Bank, “The new arab cold War”.
29hinnebusch and ehteshami, Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 40.
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8   R. HANAU SANTINI
the definition of the strongest pan-Arab credentials,30 with Nasser attacking both Syria and 
Iraq and, from the mid-1960s onward, softening tones against Saudi Arabia, hollowing out 
the previous clear-cut ideological bipolarity.
After an initial phase in which ideological proximity was deemed the key attribute in 
forging an alliance, the Egyptian bid for regional ideational hegemony fell prey to the per-
sonal power politics of Nasser, whose standing and pan-Arab legitimacy suffered a deadly 
blow with the 1967 defeat. The defeat significantly weakened Egypt’s pan-regional ideolog-
ical legitimacy claims and signalled the emergence of multiple power centres in the region. 
The short-lived bipolar phase in regional geopolitics paved the way for the consolidation 
of stronger heterarchic features within the regional security complex. Strong elements of 
regionalisation, such as socialist pan-Arabism, had only epiphenomenally led to greater 
instances of regionalism, as exemplified by the short-lived UAR, further evidence of the 
region’s difficult path towards forms of political integration.
It could not have been a Cold War without a proxy war: regional rivalries played out in 
the 1962-70 Yemen war which, starting from a fight between revolutionary and monarchical 
forces, eventually drew in both regional (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan) and international 
players (the Soviet Union, but also the US and UK). There, Soviet and Egyptian support for 
the republican side in the 1962 revolution had a military component, with Egyptian troops 
arriving in the country on 26 September 1962 alongside the republican revolutionaries, while 
Yemeni royalists took refuge in the north, asking for support from Saudi Arabia. When the 
British withdrew from Yemen in 1967, a Marxist regime came to power in South Yemen, 
further destabilizing the neighbourhood, especially fomenting an insurgency in Oman in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s.31
All the key features traditionally identifying a Cold War were therefore present in the 
region’s Arab Cold War through the 1950s and ’60s: rivalry between regional state and 
non-state actors, lack of direct military conflict, a domestically intended impact of the 
struggle, relevance of soft power beyond military and financial strength, as well as access 
to local clients.32
The 1970s represented an age of inter-Arab cooperation, characterised by the ideological 
convergence among Arab states – and, crucially, the alignment between Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia – over the identification of Israel as the main regional enemy. Even though Egypt’s 
relative material and ideational power was severely diminished in light of the military 
confrontations with Israel, this was not sufficient to determine a shift in regional polarity, 
while an intensely felt perception of Israel as the main threat to regional security and to Arab 
countries’ ability to stand up for Palestine was. The factors allowing for the consolidation of 
an Arab front within an heterarchic regional security complex were the de-securitization of 
the ideational and material threat perception represented by Nasser’s Egypt, the change in 
power rankings with Israel’s rise and, with the 1971 British withdrawal from the Gulf, the 
slowly increasing assertiveness of the Arab Gulf. In particular, this intensified when Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat signed bilateral peace accords with Israel in March 1979. Egypt’s 
30pan-arabism here is understood, as in Valbjørn and Bank, as a specific form of arab nationalism centred around the idea that 
the arab world is a pan-system whose ultimate goal is reaching territorial unity. It is different from political arabism, which 
considers the arab world an anarchic international society with distinct arab norms, among which intra-arab solidarity. 
See Valbjørn and Bank, “The new arab cold War”, 9-10.
31Katz, “The Gulf and Great powers”.
32Valbjørn, unpublished conference presentation, nottingham, May 2017.
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THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR  9
‘betrayal’ of the Palestinian cause and pan-Arab norms led to its expulsion from the Arab 
League and its ostracisation from regional politics for a decade. As a consequence, within 
such a heterarchic regional security complex, the agency of the Gulf subcomplex became 
more visible and relevant, and a new norm gained currency: the ‘conservative as stability’ 
mantra against post-revolutionary Iran’s regional outreach.
In fact, the second era of inter-Arab cooperation was triggered by the post-1979 Iranian 
threat to the Arab character of the regional order and the ensuing necessity to create and 
solidify an anti-revisionist and anti-revolutionary camp. The Iranian revolution acted as a 
catalyst in subsuming all fears and threat perceptions across the Arab world under a single 
banner. Realignments of great powers also occurred, with the US improving relations with 
pro-Soviet Iraq, while the Soviets mended ties with pro-American Oman, UAE and Qatar.33 
In 1990, however, with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, even this second epiphenomenal attempt 
at Arab unity vis-à-vis a non-Arab threat was brought to an end.34
A New Regional Cold War 
The New Regional Cold War gradually evolved in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war, a con-
flict created by an extra-regional power which was intended to lead to regime change, 
and which, by doing so, further fragmented the existing regional order. First, it caused 
a split in the Arab League: Gulf powers tacitly agreed with US military deployments, 
while Syria publicly criticised the attack, thereby fracturing hard-won Arab unity. The 
fragmentation of the regional order worsened in the post-conflict phase: the disbanding 
of the Iraqi army and the refashioning of the political system profoundly destabilized the 
country and the regional balance of threat.35 The US’ top-down creation of a multi-sec-
tarian power-sharing system rapidly empowered Shia Islamist forces, long oppressed by 
Saddam Hussein. This altered the domestic balance of power, opening up power vacuums 
that regional state and non-state actors progressively filled.36 From 2004 onwards, Iraq 
descended first into insurgency, then a full-blown civil war, in which religious and polit-
ical groups – Al Qaeda, the Badr Brigade, the Sadrist movement, later Mahdi’s army and 
ISIS – increasingly filled the gaps in power and legitimacy left by Iraqi state, justifying 
their actions in sectarian terms.37
The New Regional Cold War reached an apex in 2006 with the sectarian turn of the 
civil war in Iraq and the Hezbollah-Israeli war in the summer of that year. The two events 
attest to the double nature of the NRCW: on the one hand, the stronger regime-society 
dimension as exemplified by the victory over Israel of a non-state actor belonging to the 
‘radical bloc’, as is Hezbollah, powerfully vindicating the norm of political Arabism in a 
trans-sectarian way,38 on the other, the sectarianization of the Iraq civil war epitomised 
by Iranian and Saudi attempts to balance each other off in an increasingly heterarchic 
Iraqi context.
33Katz, “The Gulf and Great powers”.
34Springborg, “arab unity, a fickle beast”.
35Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
36Gause, International Relations of Persian Gulf. Dodge, From war to new authoritarianism.
37Dodge and Wasser, The Crisis of the Iraqi State.
38Valbjørn and Bank, “The new arab cold War”.
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Politicisation of sectarianism and the rise of non-state actors
Hezbollah’s symbolic victory over Israel projected the Iranian-created Lebanese Shia force 
beyond its sectarian dimension, transforming its Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, into 
a pan-Arab leader across the Arab world for a short period of time. A Shia non-state actor 
came to be seen as key in the resistance axis, and the last defender of the Palestinian cause. 
This amplified the cleavage between Arab regimes and their societies, further discrediting 
these regimes’ normative claims of pan-Arab solidarity. For this reason, in addition to the 
2005 assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri – a close ally of Saudi Arabia 
– the fight against Hezbollah became a priority for Gulf leaders. The eroding pan-Arab and 
nationalist legitimacy of most Arab regimes was however not only linked to the widespread 
perception across the Arab world of Hezbollah as the last bastion of defence against Israel, 
but it was also seen as a function of many Arab regimes’ post-populist nature, which man-
ifested itself with a decreasing capability to keep their socio-economic end of the bargain 
with their societies.39
At the same time, the deterioration of the domestic situation in Iraq following the 2003 
US invasion was increasingly affected by the diffusion of sectarian norms, with the progres-
sive transformation from banal sectarianism to politicized and securitized sectarianism, 
instrumentally fostered by the national and regional elites and incrementally salient at the 
societal level as well.40 It also epitomised a notable feature of this period, namely the role of 
national and transnational non-state actors, mostly militias, with the concomitant process 
of ‘militiafication’, of both Shia security forces and Sunni militant groups. Arab states were 
becoming less and less like billiard balls, increasingly struggling to insulate their domestic 
equilibrium from external developments, and increasingly differing in terms not just of 
state capabilities but also of state functions to be exercised.
Especially since April 2006, with the formal Shia ascent to power in Iraq under Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Maliki, relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran entered a new cooper-
ative era. This presented Tehran with a golden opportunity, which it immediately seized, to 
counter its international isolation, widen and strengthen its regional alliances, and adopt an 
increasingly assertive foreign policy, albeit often through asymmetric instruments, nota-
bly the financial and military role of both state (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
- IRGC) and transnational (Hezbollah) actors, in the region’s proxy wars. This took the 
shape of a so-called transnational and cross-sectarian Iran-led ‘axis of resistance’ (against 
the West, Israel and Arab Sunni Gulf monarchies), that could count on Sunni non-state 
actors (Hamas), Shia non-state actors (Hezbollah), and Arab state actors (Syria).
Unpacking the New Regional Cold War
Rather than two ideologically opposed normative claims about Arab nationalism as was 
the case in the 1950s/60s, when the sovereignty norm was held up by Gulf conservative 
monarchies against Nasser’s pan-Arab allies, the New Regional Cold War revolves around 
the politicization of sectarianism, in a reciprocal and cyclic process of securitization, in 
which each side attributes sectarian motives to the other, and assesses every foreign policy 
39hinnebusch, “authoritarian persistence”.
40hinnebusch, “Sectarianization of the Middle east”. See also Salloukh, “arab Uprisings and Geopolitics”.
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choice above all in this framework. This process had been in the making since 1979. The 
Iranian post-revolutionary regime manifestly challenged secularism and regional conserv-
ative monarchies, and exemplified the real possibility of overthrowing a dynastic regime 
while establishing a political system legitimised by a new religious doctrine, in this case 
embodied in the velāyat-e faqīh (Guardianship by an Islamic jurist) approach, developed 
by Ali Shariati and Ruholla Khomeini.41 At the same time, the gradual loss of hegemonic 
claims by Egypt after the 1967 defeat and, even more so, after the 1979 peace deal with 
Israel paved the way for the creation in 1981 of a more cohesive Sunni bloc under the aegis 
of the GCC. The threat posed by the Iranian revolutionary credentials in the 1980s and the 
phasing out of Egyptian leadership claims in the same decade enabled the Saudi kingdom 
to stake out regional leadership claims, grounded on solid financial resources, local and 
regional clients, and a reasonable degree of political stability.
The New Regional Cold War features increasingly heterarchical elements, illustrating 
the simultaneous concentration and dispersion of power in the region. At the domestic 
level, they include the privatization of coercion, the retreat of the state from the monopoly 
of violence, the intensification of the sectarianization process, and the multiplication of 
centres of power.
At the regional level, they range from the proliferation of conflicts turning into proxy 
wars, to the multiplication of non-state actors taking sides in the confrontation or acting as 
spoilers, to the multiple power rankings within the region’s numerous hierarchies.
The New Regional Cold War is premised on a securitized rivalry between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia alongside several axes of competition 
and multiple rankings. The transformation of this relationship from rivals into enemies has 
occurred in the last fifteen years and has become the defining conflict shaping the MENA 
regional security complex. The Gulf subcomplex has shown an unprecedented capacity to 
influence security dynamics in the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt) and the Maghreb (Libya 
and to a lesser extent Morocco and Tunisia), drawing regional non-Arab players (Turkey) 
and international powers (Russia, the US and several European countries) into regional 
proxy wars, most notably in Syria, but also in Libya and Yemen.
The two geopolitical blocs have accused each other of sectarianizing not just the Gulf, but 
the whole region. In light of these dynamics, in the last decade sectarianism has been trans-
formed into a defining regional cleavage, orienting other political and geopolitical cleavages, 
and acting almost as an ordering principle. This has been enabled by its pervasive presence 
in Arab leaders’ official rhetoric and its successful appropriation and re-appropriation among 
wide strata of both Shia and Sunni populations. Ussama Makdisi powerfully argues in this 
respect that, in recent times, sectarianism in both its local and foreign agency, has been 
employed by various Arab and foreign leaders not as an objective signifier of violence, but 
as an ideological signifier of a particular form of violence.42
The extreme politicization of a confrontation depicted as zero-sum has had a twofold 
purpose: as a diversionary tactic of domestically vulnerable Gulf monarchies to divert 
attention away from their democratic and economic shortcomings, and as a catalyst to 
foster intra-bloc cohesion, especially within the GCC. While the 2011 uprisings stirred a 
counter-revolutionary response from conservative monarchies, spanning from Morocco to 
41al rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State.
42Makdisi, “Mythology of Sectarian Middle east”.
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12   R. HANAU SANTINI
Jordan and the Gulf monarchies, in an arc uniting a “pan-royal epistemic community”,43 this 
has not been sufficient to avoid intra-GCC rifts. Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s relations with 
Qatar turned sour in 2014, exponentially so in June 2017. This cleavage reflects the second 
dimension of the NRCW beyond sectarianization, namely the ideational confrontation 
over the norms of political Islam.
The deterioration of Iranian-Saudi relations – something that has been depicted by some 
as an Islamic Cold War44 – worsened with the 2011 uprisings in Bahrain and the eastern part 
of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh considered both to be Iranian initiatives, similar in intention and 
goal to the week-long protests in Qatif and Al-Bahr Ahsa in November 1979. The official 
Saudi narrative downplayed, if not ignored altogether, the initially cross-sectarian nature 
of the protests, which had been met by the Bahraini regime in an appeasing mode until the 
intensification of Saudi pressures.45
This intensification should be understood as a part of Riyadh’s wider geopolitical consid-
erations. Since the Bahraini turmoil, Saudi official media have increasingly depicted Iran as 
a dual security threat and have created a demonized enemy attempting to impose regional 
hegemony. In particular, two elements have been brought together to create this powerful 
image: the transnational dimension of Twelver Shiism and the aggressive Persian foreign 
policy orientation of the Islamic Republic. From this point of view, the solidarity shown by 
Tehran with Bahraini Shia was interpreted as an instrumental tactic aimed at overthrowing 
the Bahraini monarchy and threatening Saudi and Qatari strategic interests from a closer 
distance.46 The democratic credentials of the protests in Bahrain were questioned, as their 
calls for change were attributed to Tehran and its Shia agenda, and local protesters were 
depicted as mere loudspeakers for Tehran. In particular, the Iranian Republic was accused of 
wanting to transform the Arab Gulf into several Shia provinces, directly linked to Tehran.47 
In this respect, the alleged overarching Iranian strategic goal was not the diffusion of Shiism 
per se, but rather the re-establishment of Persian hegemony over Arab lands, as it was before 
the coming of the Prophet. In this view, Bahrain represented only a step in a wider Persian 
project of expansionism, which started in 1971 with the occupation of the three Emirati 
islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs.48
Within this view, the sectarian dimension of Iranian foreign policy can only be under-
stood in conjunction with the Islamic Republic’s regional ambitions, based on alliances with 
Shia forces, and intending to institutionalize sectarianism (ṭā'ifiyya) as the dominant social 
and political norm across the region.49
The post-2011 GCC: between integration and fragmentation
If threats travel more easily with geographic proximity, the revolts in Bahrain and the 
Saudi Eastern province rang alarm bells not only in Riyadh but also within the GCC. The 
perceived Iranian sponsored ‘fifth columns’ of Shia populations in both countries initially 
43a term used by Yom in “authoritarian monarchies as epistemic community”.
44Koelbl et al., “The cold War of Islam”.
45Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf.
46el amri, “Bahrain: pearl of the arab Gulf”.
47al atibi, “It’s not sectarianism”.
48Ibid.
49al Dakhil, “Iran: the sectarian role disappoints”, 9. For similar considerations on ‘persian ambitions’ in Iraq and Saudi’s non-sec-
tarian attitude, see Kawtharani, “Saudi arabia’s enticements”.
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spurred an intra-monarchical bandwagoning effect, with the 2011 Peninsula Shield military 
intervention in Bahrain, the invitation extended by the GCC to the Moroccan and Jordanian 
monarchies to join the organisation, and the signature of the Joint Security Agreement in 
November 2012 among GCC+2 (Jordan and Morocco) Interior Ministers. The agreement, 
supposedly targeting counter-terrorism, paved the way for online regional cross-policing 
among Sunni monarchies in order to repress domestic dissent.50
The attempted enlargement of the monarchical axis to the Levant and Maghreb bypassed 
the Arab League, and although it never materialized, remains a symbolically powerful 
reminder of Saudi-led counter-revolutionary efforts. With the first electoral victories of the 
Islamist Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the previous focus on 
counter-revolutionary regime security took a new turn and two dimensions merged: the 
perception of potential regime insecurity was now driven both by revolutionary societal 
forces in the region and the role of Islamist political actors capitalising on these post- 
revolutionary configurations. Ennahda won the first democratic elections in Tunisia in 
October 2011 and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012, inaugurating the first dem-
ocratic presidential mandate with an Islamist head of state. Saudi King Abdullah reacted 
by withholding funding and freezing bilateral relations with both countries. This frac-
tured the intra-GCC camp, given Qatari proximity to the Muslim Brothers, something 
which worsened when the military waged a coup in Egypt in July 2013 and Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE accused Qatar of hosting Brotherhood figures and preachers. This led to the 
first spat between Qatar and the core of the GCC, with some members (Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait) withholding their ambassadors from Doha between March and 
November 2014, only restoring diplomatic ties when Qatar allegedly promised diminished 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood.51 The rapprochement conveniently took place in 
November 2014, a month prior to the annual GCC meeting scheduled in Doha.
The second Qatar crisis began in June 2017 when the Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini and 
Egyptian governments turned against Qatar, imposing a diplomatic standoff and a de facto 
blockade on Doha. The anti-Qatar quartet released a list of demands (initially thirteen, later 
reduced to six), with a July 2017 deadline that Doha let pass, amid regional (mostly led by 
Kuwait, and to a lesser extent Oman) and international (led by US Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson) diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis. The Saudi-Emirati anti-Brotherhood axis 
has struggled to include other regional powers beyond the quartet: North African and Levant 
states, even financially dependent ones such as Jordan, have hedged and remained neutral. 
Other regional powerhouses, such as Turkey, have gone the extra mile and sent military 
forces to defend Qatar’s sovereignty, thereby further fragmenting established norms of Gulf 
security.52 The way in which the escalation of the crisis against Qatar has been played out by 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE has had the unintended, but not counter-intuitive, side-effect of 
pushing Iran to reach out not only to Qatar, but also to Oman and Kuwait, further reducing 
the cohesiveness of the Arab Gulf ’s balancing against Iran.
As recounted by Achcar, since its independence from Britain in 1971, Qatar has sought 
to preserve some room for manoeuvre for itself in regional diplomacy.53 This became more 
visible once Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani came to power in 1995 and managed good 
50Yom, “collaboration and community”.
51aboudi et al., “Saudi arabia, Uae and Bahrain end rift”.
52lynch, “Three big lessons of Qatar crisis”.
53achcar,”campaign against Qatar”.
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relations with both the United States – the most important American military base in the 
region is located at Al Udeid, in Qatar – and the Islamic Republic, with which it shares the 
world’s largest gas field (North Dome in Qatar, South Pars in Iran). Qatar maintained its 
constructive diplomacy with opposing actors (the US and Iran, Israel and Hamas, Gulf 
monarchies and the Brotherhood), even when Saudi Arabia broke off relations with the 
Brotherhood – which it had supported from its inception in 1928 – after the Brotherhood 
denounced the US intervention to defend Kuwait in 1990. Not only did Qatar continue 
diplomatic relations with the Brotherhood, it gave them a sympathetic media platform, 
Al Jazeera, and after the coup against Morsi in 2013 offered many Brothers refuge. For 
Riyadh, that was the gravest sin Doha could commit. After the 2014 peak of the intra-GCC 
conflict, Qatar mended ties and participated in the Saudi military campaign against Saleh 
in Yemen, supported the Syrian opposition along with the Saudis and Emiratis, and overall 
kept a lower profile.
A particularly relevant external contingent factor (the different US policy under Trump 
with respect to that of Obama) has propelled a new round of conflict, which in June 2017 
fractured the intra-Sunni consensus. This left Turkey taking sides with Qatar, Kuwait medi-
ating, and Iran, whose privileged relations with Doha cannot be jeopardised given the 
magnitude of shared economic interests, emboldened. The continuation of the underbal-
ancing of Iran has been favoured by the 2014 and 2017 intra-Sunni divisions within the Gulf 
subcomplex, which have eroded the cohesiveness of the Arab Gulf, led extra-Gulf actors in 
to the subcomplex’s security dynamics and projected an image of norm fragmentation and 
multiplicity of enemies to the detriment of prospects for further regionalism.54
The heterarchic features of the NRCW have been amplified by the activation of the two 
regional cleavages – the politicization of sectarianism along the Saudi-Iran axis, and the 
intra-Sunni cleavage around the norm of political Islam. Without a prioritisation of threats 
responding to alliance patterns or region-building logics, this has increased the fragmen-
tation of both the normative and the political regional order.
Cleavages behind the regional proxy wars
The New Regional Cold War has played out in several contexts and manifests itself in 
transforming civil conflicts into regional ones. After the summer of 2011, Syria quickly 
morphed into both a civil war and a proxy conflict. On this military front, Iran, with the 
international protective umbrella offered by Russia, has massively intervened in support of 
Bashar Al Assad, counting on the military and logistical help of Hezbollah, which thereby 
lost its painfully acquired post-sectarian credentials.55
Syria was followed by the conflict that erupted in post-Qadhafi Libya, where Qatar threw 
its weight behind the Islamist Libyan Dawn, which then created a UN-backed government in 
Tripoli, challenged by militarized dissidents led by General Khalifa Haftar, a former general 
heading the nationalist camp, supported by the UAE and Egypt. This second military front 
is a predominantly Arab one, Gulf-led, centred around another element of political identity, 
that is political Islam. This conflict epitomises on a military level the intra-Sunni and intra-
Gulf division between Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other.
54Gause explores the ongoing underbalancing of Iran in ”Ideologies, alignments and Underbalancing”.
55Valbjørn and Bank, “The new arab cold War”.
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The third proxy conflict of the new Cold War has been raging in Yemen. In March 2015, 
Saudi troops entered the neighbouring country in the wake of the Houthi forces’ conquest 
of the capital, Sanaa, and the escape to the north of Mansour Hadi, president in power since 
the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh, now allied with the Houthis. Despite a strong pro-
Houthi rhetoric, some military training offered through Hezbollah and the Revolutionary 
Guards and small weapon transfers through Oman, Iran has, until mid-2017, fallen short 
of intervening to the extent Westerns powers and Saudi Arabia have in propping up Hadi.56
What had been planned by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as a blitzkrieg 
has turned into what many define as Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vietnam war’, with almost 3 million 
Yemenis internally displaced, and over 10,000 Yemeni and 100 Saudis dead.57 This aggressive 
foreign policy posture has been justified at the domestic level, with the new King Salman, 
in power since January 2015, eager to pave the way to succession for his son, Mohammed 
bin Salman, who waged the war in Yemen shortly after being nominated Defence Minister.
As with Libya and Yemen, the case of Syria shows the extent to which states in the region 
have shown a high degree of permeability as a function of the successful framing of trans-
state identity claims. It also shows how revolutionary Shiism or Wahhabism are deemed to 
be able to influence the religious and political legitimacy of Iran and Saudi Arabia and their 
authority to act as legitimate representatives of Islam and the Islamic umma.
In an apparent reversal of its previously staunch anti-Shia policy in Iraq (notably, anti-Al 
Maliki), Riyadh sent an ambassador back to Baghdad in early 2016 for the first time in 
two decades as part of a broader strategy of engaging with some Iraqi Shia communities 
and building a post-sectarian discourse. At that time, according to some commentators, 
Riyadh was ready to supersede, if not abandon, a sectarian rhetoric against Iran and frame 
the Iranian threat as a Persian one, posed against a pan-Arab norm. This tactic did not bear 
fruits and the Saudi ambassador was recalled after his speeches were considered to have 
overstepped his diplomatic room for manoeuvre.58 With the exception of this short period 
of time, the increasingly competitive nature of the region’s identity environment has been 
characterised by reciprocal attempts by Tehran and Riyadh to discredit or vilify each other’s 
religious authority claims, while emphasizing or praising their own, and the deployment of 
a number of strategies and policy tools in an increasingly zero-sum game where the overall 
geopolitical framework has become dominated by a friend vs foe logic.59
The evolution of the New Regional Cold War has displayed a trend toward a regional heter-
archical configuration, characterised by multiple power rankings, multiple actors and multiple 
levels of governance. Much of the GCC’s identification of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the 
major threat to domestic and Gulf stability has failed to drive Arab Gulf states’ foreign poli-
cies consistently, as other cleavages, notably over the norms of political Islam, have increased 
their salience and produced shifts in threat perception and subsequent balancing behaviour.
Conclusion
Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Gulf subcomplex, including Iran, Iraq and Gulf 
Arab states, has been on the rise in terms of its capacity to influence the Levant, North Africa 
56hiltermann and longley alley, “The houthis are not hezbollah”.
57pillar, “entanglement in Yemen”; Shaheen, “Yemen death toll has reached 10,000”.
58Kawtharani, “Saudi arabia’s enticements”.
59Wiktorowicz, on the basis of his study of al Qaeda, “Framing Jihad”.
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and the regional order configuration. What has taken shape since then, however, is a New 
Regional Cold War hinging on two main dimensions: the return of divisive identity politics 
under the guise of politicized sectarianism, exacerbating the meddling of transnational and 
extra-regional actors; and an intra-Sunni contest mostly driven by the Arab Gulf over the 
norms of political Islam.
The former has been justified on a rhetorical level by reciprocal accusations between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia of sectarian-driven expansionism. However, rather than representing the 
only cleavage ordering the friend-enemy relations of regional geopolitics, the intra-Sunni 
fractures between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the reshaping of allegiances this spat has 
created, have multiplied the rankings and the criteria that determine the way in which the 
Gulf subcomplex will evolve.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s constant, twofold threat perception with varying degrees 
of intensity of, on the one hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially since the 2015 
international agreement on the country’s nuclear program and, on the other, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, despite its ejection from power in Egypt in 2013, has led to a regional order 
that is neither anarchic nor hierarchic, but one in which threat perceptions and regional 
alignments change rapidly and different actors occupy different ranking positions according 
to the issue area.
As far as rankings go, a struggle for primacy among competing political identities can be 
identified. On the one hand, Qatar, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood have long stood 
for Sunni political Islam and its political legitimacy across the region. On the other hand, 
sectarian allegiances separate Gulf countries plus North Africa from Iran, Syria, Hezbollah 
and Iraq.
In terms of regional proxy wars, Iran and Hezbollah, with the help of Russia, seem to 
have the upper hand in Syria, having kept Bashar Al Assad in power for over six years. The 
opposing camp, headed by Saudi Arabia, and actively counting on the GCC and Turkey, 
has so far been losing the battle on the ground, as well as the soft power advantage in win-
ning hearts and minds internationally in terms of imagining a post-Assad Syria. In Libya, 
both Egypt and the UAE, in light of their strong anti-Brotherhood attitude, have remained 
strongly pro-Haftar, with Saudi Arabia keeping a lower profile. Lastly, in Yemen, Iran, espe-
cially in the form of the IRGC has increasingly supported the Houthis, while Saudi Arabia 
has been trapped in a long and costly conflict in support of Hadi, and laments the limited 
engagement of many of its coalition partners, including Qatar and Egypt.
The presence of heterarchic features speaks to the inability of any single power to order 
the region, and to the lack of a single ranking principle (material capabilities, power pro-
jection, identity norms, soft power) that is widely considered the decisive one. The absence 
of agreement over the relative importance of one ranking over others will likely result in 
further diplomatic crises, bickering, rifts, and an overall fragmentation of a regional order 
that suffers from centrifugal tendencies.
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